Federated identity » History » Version 18
Tom Clegg, 06/20/2017 08:53 PM
1 | 1 | Tom Clegg | h1. Federated identity |
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3 | 9 | Tom Clegg | See |
4 | * #11453 |
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5 | 10 | Tom Clegg | * #11874 |
6 | 9 | Tom Clegg | |
7 | 1 | Tom Clegg | A person should be able to create an account and get a token from a single identity provider, and use that token to access private/protected resources on multiple Arvados clusters. |
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9 | Motivating use cases: |
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10 | * A user on cluster B shares a project with a user on cluster A. |
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11 | * A container running on cluster A reads and writes data on cluster B. |
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12 | * A user logged in to Workbench A can search/view/download/upload collections at cluster B. |
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14 | Configuration examples: |
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15 | * An organization has 5 clusters, but only one of them has user accounts and roles in its database. |
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16 | * An on-premise cluster runs containers that use public data stored in the cloud (without mirroring the data locally). |
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18 | 18 | Tom Clegg | h2. Relevant principles |
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20 | Cluster "bbbbb" is authoritative for objects whose UUIDs start with "bbbbb-". This applies to both the object's state and the set of user/group UUIDs that are allowed to read/write the object. |
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21 | * This implies that permission links whose head_uuid starts with "bbbbb-" exist only on cluster bbbbb. (If they exist elsewhere, they should be ignored.) |
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23 | 1 | Tom Clegg | h2. Design sketch |
24 | 8 | Tom Clegg | |
25 | Each Arvados client must be able to prove to cluster B that it is authorized by cluster A to act on behalf of a user account which is controlled by cluster A. This must not involve giving enough information to cluster B to act on behalf of the user account: for example, the client cannot simply give cluster B its cluster A token for the purpose of doing a canary query: doing so would allow cluster B to exercise the client's authority on cluster C, D, and E as well. |
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26 | 1 | Tom Clegg | |
27 | 18 | Tom Clegg | h2. Protocol ideas |
28 | 1 | Tom Clegg | |
29 | "Salted tokens": instead of passing its literal token, the client passes the token UUID and @HMAC(token, "bbbbb")@ when sending a request to cluster B (where "bbbbb" is cluster B's cluster ID / UUID prefix). Cluster B validates the request by passing those two parameters untouched to a "verify request" ("no-op") endpoint at cluster A. |
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30 | 7 | Tom Clegg | * API server hands out tokens in the form "tokenUUID <delimiter> secret" instead of just the secret part. |
31 | 6 | Tom Clegg | * Cluster B figures out cluster A's API endpoint by looking at the "site ID prefix" of the token UUID. |
32 | * Cluster B can be configured with a lookup table (clusterID→apiHost) to override the implicit {id}.arvadosapi.com |
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33 | * Cluster B can be configured to _only_ use the lookup table, i.e., to never use implicit {id}.arvadosapi.com endpoints |
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34 | 1 | Tom Clegg | |
35 | 18 | Tom Clegg | "Cluster-scoped tokens": the client contacts cluster A to get a scoped token which only allows "GET /users/current" on cluster A but is accepted by cluster B as an [all] token for that user. |
36 | 1 | Tom Clegg | |
37 | 6 | Tom Clegg | h2. Adding permissions |
38 | 1 | Tom Clegg | |
39 | 6 | Tom Clegg | There are a few permission-granting cases to consider. |
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41 | |grantor|grantee|object|notes| |
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42 | |user on site A|user on site A|object on site A|(existing permission system)| |
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43 | |user on site A|group on site A|object on site A|(existing permission system)| |
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44 | |user on site A|user or group on site A|object on site B|Client creates a link at site B. Site B asks site A whether the grantee user/group is visible to user A.| |
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45 | |user on site A|user or group on site B|object on site B|Client creates a link at site B. Site B asks site A for a list of groups user A can see, then checks whether (possibly via one of those groups) user A can read the grantee user/group according to site B's local database.| |
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46 | 1 | Tom Clegg | |user on site A|user or group on site B|object on site A|Client creates a link at site A. Site A generates a salted token and uses it to ask site B whether user A can read the grantee user/group.| |
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48 | 18 | Tom Clegg | In all of these cases, "user on site A" has a UUID starting with "aaaaa-" and therefore uses a token issued by cluster A (see "protocol ideas" above). |
49 | 12 | Peter Amstutz | |
50 | 18 | Tom Clegg | When site B connects to site A in the course of processing request R, it uses the token provided by the client in request R. |
51 | 14 | Peter Amstutz | |
52 | 4 | Tom Clegg | h2. TODO |
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54 | 1 | Tom Clegg | Things to address |
55 | 11 | Peter Amstutz | |
56 | 4 | Tom Clegg | * how to sync groups |
57 | * diagrams |
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58 | * mnemonic cluster names / more concrete examples (including who is reachable on the internet) |
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59 | 6 | Tom Clegg | * [how] do you get a list of users/groups you can share stuff with? |
60 | 4 | Tom Clegg | * clarify what UUIDs look like (some people have A uuids, some have B uuids) |
61 | 11 | Peter Amstutz | * [[Cross-cluster delegation]] |